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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the e¤ect of cost misreporting of extractive rms on the optimal design
of tax policies. We build a two-period, two-country model where governments aim to attract a
foreign-owned multinational rm to raise tax revenues by levying a prot tax and a royalty. The
rm overstates its production costs to reduce declared prots and it decides in which country
to locate. We nd that cost overstatement pushes royalties upward but remains detrimental for
tax revenues as well as the capital invested by the rm. The mining country that attracts the
extractive rm is often the country with the highest coe¢ cient of overstatement. However, the rm
may locate in the country with the lowest overstatement and lowest royalty if both countries have
the same prot tax. Reinforcing expertise in mining sectors to reduce asymmetries of information
between rms and tax authorities appears to be a priority in developing resource countries.
Keywords: Resource countries, Rent taxes, Royalties, Cost misreporting.
JEL Classication: H25, H32, O13
1 Introduction
The strong dependence of some developing countries on extractive resources is a well-known source
of vulnerability. Most of these countries have low tax rates and often proceed by trial and error in
using various instruments to tax the rent on non-renewal resources. Previous research suggests the
use of both royalties and prot taxes (corporate income tax, for example) among a range of other
tax categories for extracting resources (IMF 2012). While it is usually easy to show the distortive
character of an ad-valorem tax levied directly on the extraction of the resource (the royalty), the
analysis becomes more interesting when considering the possibility for mining companies to reduce
their taxable income by cost manipulation. Boadway and Keen (2010 and 2015) justify the use of
prot taxes and royalties in presence of asymmetries of information. This aspect is particularly
relevant for low-income countries where governments have a severe informational disadvantage
vis-à-vis resource extraction companies (Collier 2010).
Among the open questions, an important one concerns the pressures from international tax
competition for attracting mining companies on resource tax policy. In this paper, we aim to
give some insight into this issue. More specically, we contribute to the research on tax design
for extractive resources in low-income countries under international tax competition. We build a
partial equilibrium model of two countries where the government sets royalties and prot taxes to
attract a foreign extractive rm.
A number of signals and stylized facts observed in di¤erent developing countries suggests the
presence of forms of international tax competition for attracting multinational mining companies1
For instance, in sub-Saharan Africa reforms of mining codes began in the 1980s and were general-
ized across the continent in the 1990s.2 They led to the widespread adoption of liberalized mining
codes, the wholesale privatization of state companies, an end to foreign ownership restrictions. The
new codes are designed to attract foreign investment through various incentives to foreign mining
1To the best of our knowledge, there is no econometric analysis on international tax competition for resource
extraction in developing countries. Unfortunately, despite the progress generated by the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI), the available data do not allow for the construction of a relevant taxation indicator
on an extended period.
2Similar reforms have occured in Latin American countries (NSI, 2013).
companies (Campbell 2010; Besada and Martin 2013; Moussa et al. 2015). Thus the framework
for an international tax competition is in place. In 2014, the Ivorian Parliament approved a new
mining code, with the aim of attracting more international investors in gold extraction, which has
long been neglected in this country, compared to its neighbors. A special tax on exceptional prots
has been removed from the project.3 In March 2016, the government of Ghana agreed to lower
the corporate tax from 35% to 32.5% in addition to lowering the royalty rate for Gold Fields, a
South African company that was reviewing a $100 million expansion of gold mining operations in
the country.4 In addition, in Zambia, some initiatives were taken in 2015 to redesign the mining
tax regimes in order to make the country more attractive to foreign investors.
According to the Mining Tax Database for Africa developed by Laporte et al (2016), updated
in 2018, covering 21 African gold-producing countries, the average rate of corporate income tax
decreased from 30% to 25,9% on the period 2000-2018.5 Ten countries, including Burkina-Faso,
Côte dIvoire, Guinea, Mali, South Africa, have decreased their rate. In parallel, the average rate
of royalties rose from 3.9 to 4.6% (14 pays have increased their rate; including Burkina-Faso, Côte
dIvoire, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Zimbabwe). Note that these two opposite evolutions will be
rationalized in our model.
The specialized press regularly reports issues typically associated with strategies consistent
with international tax competition to attract mining companies. For example, the Fraser Insti-
tute conducts an annual survey asking managers of mining companies to grade countries and states
according to their investment potential (Fraser Institute 2015). An index of perceived attractive-
ness is constructed on the basis of 15 policy factors that inuence company decisions to invest in
various jurisdictions. Taxation features (including personal, corporate, payroll, capital and other
taxes, and the complexity of tax compliance) appear prominently.6
3www.mining.com, 3.29.2016. These new scal measures are greatly appreciated by the mining company, Rand-
gold (based in Caïman), and can also be found in other African countries.
4This large mining company, with operations from Australia to Peru, had not yet decided whether to inject
more cash into the project or keep the gold in the ground.
5https://scalite-miniere.ferdi.fr/
6In regards to African countries, in the 2015 report, the changes in scal regimes is the most commonly mentioned
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In this paper, we set a model of tax competition between two countries that aim to attract
a foreign-owned multinational rm. The rm chooses its location by taking into account the
tax burden, royalties and rent tax to be paid in each country. Tax authorities in each country
must rely on self-reporting by the rm to establish tax liabilities, which - though the government
has an opportunity to audit those reports - puts rms in a position of informational advantage.
This asymmetry is always present, but is particularly marked in the resource sector in developing
countries. More specically, following Boadway and Keen (2005), we assume that the resource
rm purposefully overstates its costs, with the aim of paying lower taxes. The tax authority in the
developing country is unable to identify the overstatement. The two governments need to decide
the optimal tax policy to attract the rm to their the country while still collecting the highest
possible tax revenue. A conict is inherent because higher taxes increase tax revenues but may
push the rm towards the other country. In such a setting, we analyze the role of royalties in tax
competition. In the absence of information about how rms decide the rate of cost overstatement,
we analyze two scenarios. In the rst, the rate of overstatement of productions costs is a constant
coe¢ cient. In the second scenario, costs are overstated with a coe¢ cient that depends positively
on the prot tax in the country.
Our main result can be summarized as follows. Under a constant rate of overstatement,
asymmetries of information are detrimental for all agents for the governments as well as for the
rmsprots. Furthermore, ine¢ ciencies are amplied because in order to be attractive, a country
will decrease the prot tax rate and increase the royalty.
Our study contributes to two strands of the existing literature, namely the optimal tax policy
design in extractive industries and the international public economics literature.
Since the pioneering work of Hotelling (1931) and Brown (1948), an abundant literature on
resource taxation has focused on tax instruments capable of capturing a portion of the specic
rents in the mining industry. Indeed, the distinctive features of extractive industries as the rel-
topic in the comments made by top executives to justify their gradings, followed by corruption issues. According
to a United Nations survey of mining companies in 2005, 60% of the top 10 decision criteria a prospective mining
investor considers before undertaking a mining project are tax related (see Ernst & Young, Taxation of extractive
industries in East and Central Africa. Are these in harmony? Africa Tax Conference, 2015.)
3
atively xed supply, collective ownership of resources and information asymmetry can legitimate
an ine¢ cient taxation as royalties (Boadway and Keen 2010). Royalties involve ine¢ cient resource
exploitation (depletion) and tend to take complex forms in order to be more responsive to prof-
itability (Garnaut and Clunies-Roos 1975, 1983; Otto et al. 2006). Taxation engineering has
been developed to model the e¤ects of various taxes on extractive resources (cf. the survey by
Smith 2013). In our paper, following Boadway and Keen (2010 and 2015), we are not interested
in exploring the di¤erent types of royalties and rent taxes, but rather focus on a combination of a
simple royalty and a prot tax introduced into a tax competition setting.
The tax competition literature has generally neglected the extractive industries. These indus-
tries, such as mining for instance, are unique and not easily compared to other generic sectors.
Countries hosting mines must compete for highly mobile international exploration and develop-
ment investment capital. Furthermore, many mines are hosted by developing countries that su¤er
from a lack of expertise in mining that negatively a¤ects their ability to verify the tax declarations
of foreign rms. Hence, classical tax competition models are unadapted to analyzing the e¤ect of
tax competition on tax design in the extractive sectors of developing countries. The objective of
this paper is to o¤er a suitable setting to highlight the specicities of these industries and cor-
responding countries in the context of open economies. The classical tax competition literature
concentrates on the size of the countries, nding that the rm always invests in the larger country
when the home market e¤ect is stronger than the tax incentives o¤ered by the small country
(Hauer and Wooton, 1999). Market size plays a minor role when countries broaden their scal
instruments by competing not only through taxes, but also through the level of infrastructure that
boosts the prots of rms (Justman et al, 2001, ; Hindriks et al. 2008; Pieretti and Zanaj, 2011
among others). Barros and Cabral (2000) consider a subsidy game between asymmetric countries
aiming to attract foreign direct investments to alleviate unemployment. In equilibrium, the winner
is the country that gains the most in terms of employment for given transportation costs. Here, we
outline a similar game where two countries where the government sets royalties and prot taxes
to attract a foreign extractive rm in the context of cost overstatement by the rm.
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The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. Sections 3 develops the
analysis of tax decision under constant overstatement. In Section 4, we present the tax choices
in the absence of cost overstatement to underscore the e¤ect of these asymmetries of information.
Conclusions are provided in Section 5.
2 The model
Consider a two-period model with two countries denoted by a and b. Each country hosts a mine
that can be exploited by a foreign rm.7 Each government imposes an ad valorem royalty at rate
i; i = a; b on the revenues of the extracting rm and a prot tax on reported rents/prots at rate
 i; i = a; b: Tax authorities in each country rely on rm self-reporting to establish tax liabilities,
putting the rm at a signicant informational advantage as compared to the tax authority.
A resource rm decides which mine to exploit while operating in a competitive commodity
market. Previous work has shown that the price of the extracted good, as for instance gold, is
xed on the global market.8 It follows that the price p of the mineral is the same in both countries
and normalized for simplicity.
The resource rm is a foreign-owned multinational that decides to locate its branch either in
country a or in b. The monopoly condition of the mine is dictated by the nature of the market.
As a matter of fact, the right to exploit a mine is usually given exclusively only to one rm. The
rm is risk-neutral and capital markets are competitive and e¢ cient.
The production technology is simplied so that the producer incurs capital costs for exploration
and development in the rst period, and only costs of extraction in the second period, when the
resource is being exploited. Hence, the resource rm incurs an initial investment K in the rst
period in order to generate a quantity of the resource q(K) with certainty in the second period.
The corresponding extractive costs in the second period are given by C [q(K)] ; @C [q(K)] =@K >
7We focus on the e¤ects of international tax competition on tax design and therefore make the simplifying
assumption that only foreign multinational rms that are mobile can exploit the mine.
8The price-taking behavior of the extractive rm in the market for the resource is documented in OConnor et
al. 2016.
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0; @2C [q(K)] =@2K > 0. Finally, under competitive and e¢ cient global credit markets, the resource
rm can borrow and lend at a competitive risk-free interest rate r, which constitutes its discount
rate factor for future period prots.
The key assumption of the model is that the resource rm may overstate production costs by
multiplying these costs by a factor  that exceeds one. Crucially, the tax authority is unable to
know the nature of the extractive cost of the rm, hence it is unable to determine whether the
factor  is cost overstatement or it is part of the production costs of the rm.
Two scenarios are analyzed. In the rst, overstatement is country specic, tax independent,
xed coe¢ cient i
i  1; i = a; b;
whereas in the second scenario, the overstatement is assumed to be a linear function of the prot
tax  i
i i  1; i = a; b:
In the second scenario, as in Boadway and Keen (2010) the higher the rent tax in the country, the
higher the rms incentive to overstate its costs. In both scenarios, we assume that the coe¢ cient
of overstatement is country specic. This suggests that overstatement does not depend on the
rm but on features of the country such as the level of corruption in a country or the countrys
lack of expertise. Our hypothesis is that the higher the level of corruption and/or the weaker the
expertise in mining technologies, the larger the door to cost overstatement. For readability of the
paper, we relegate the analysis of the second scenario in the Appendix B.
The two governments are assumed to be risk-neutral, to be imperfectly informed, and to be
able to commit to the tax policy they announce before location takes place. This time consistency
of the tax policy may be guaranteed by international contracts law.
The objective function of the government intervention is to raise revenues as well as to attract
the rm to its country. The two governments anticipate that the rm selects its location based
on prots after tax and thus the governmental decision is a¤ected by the classical horizontal tax
externality that appears when tax competition for mobile tax bases induces a race to the bottom,
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resulting in ine¢ ciently low tax receipts.
In the next section, we investigate the scenario of constant overstatement. First, we dene the
optimal tax policy and the corresponding capital investment, then we analyze the tax competition
aspects. In Section 4, we turn our attention to the scenario with absence of overstatement, where
we again look at the optimal capital investment as well as the location decision of the rm in a
tax competition setting. Section 5 concludes.
3 Optimal tax design under constant overstatement
3.1 Absence of tax competition
The rm select an amount of invested capital to maximize its real prot. To obtain closed form
solutions, in line with the existing literature (Boadway and Keen 2010 and 2015), we assume
that nal transformation follows a linear function q(K) = K whereas extractive costs are, for
simplicity, quadratic C(q(K)) = 1
2

1

q(K)
2
. The parameter  is an e¢ ciency measure.
The net prot of the rm writes as:
i( i; i) = (1   i)

 Ki +
(1  i)Ki   12K2i
1 + r

; i = a; b (1)
The prot of the rm is composed of two parts. The rst part is simply the initial capital Ki
invested in the rst period in country i; the second part of the prot consists in the net present
value of the total revenues from selling the nal output quantity (1  i)Ki minus the extraction
costs 1
2
K2i .
Being concavity conditions satised, optimal capital investment as a function of taxes is given
by:
Ki(i) =  (1  i)  r   1 > 0; i = a; b (2)
We assume  (1  i) > 1 + r : the net productivity of the transformation technology (1   i)
in each country i is higher than the alternative investment of a unit of capital. This assumption
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guarantees that the rm has incentives to invest its capital to exploiting a mine rather than simply
deposit it and receive the interest rate r: Clearly, the higher the royalty i; i = a; b, the lower the
invested capital.
The government in each country i; i = a; b; selects the tax policy mix ( i; i) to maximize the
amount of tax revenues Ri( i; i), namely,
Ri( i; i) =
1
1 + r

i [Ki(i)] + i

(1  i)Ki(i)  i
1
2
[Ki(i)]
2

; i = a; b:
Governmental tax receipts are also composed of two parts. The rst captures tax receipts from
royalties i [Ki(i)] , levied over rmsrevenues Ki(i): The second part consists of tax receipts
from levying the prot tax,  i

(1  i)Ki(i)  i 12 [Ki(i)]2

. Di¤erently from royalties, the
prot tax is applied over the entire declared prot.
To obtain the optimal tax policy ( i ; 

i ); i = a; b; we check that concavity conditions of
Ri( i; i): We nd that the FOCs are satised with respect to the royalty leading to an internal
solution, whereas the optimal prot tax is a corner solution. Since @Ri( i; i)=@ i > 0; i = a; b; it
follows that each government xes the highest possible prot tax named maxi , i = a; b:
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We can state the following result:
Proposition 1 Assuming a constant coe¢ cient of cost overstatement, a revenue maximizing
government selects the highest prot tax possible maxi and a royalty rate 

i given by
i=
(1 + r   2 + i (  r   1)) maxi + (  r   1)
 (2 (1  maxi ) + imaxi )
; i = a; b (3)
Positivity of the optimal royalty is guaranteed under the condition
 > (r + 1)
1 + maxi (i   1)
1 + maxi (i   2)
: (4)
9We remain agnostic about the level of such a tax maxi ; i = a; b; but one can imagine that the
government xes the prot tax in a larger scal policy concerning the whole economy and beyond
the mining sector.
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Proposition 1 shows that in the presence of cost overstatement, a revenue-maximizing govern-
ment selects the highest possible prot tax and the lowest royalty. This property is reminiscent of
well-known results in the existing literature on optimal taxation. Royalties bring distortive e¤ects
on tax revenues because they increase the burden of taxation on rm revenues while neglecting
the rms costs. The optimal tax policy that alleviates this distortion will privilege high-prot
taxes while reducing royalties as much as possible. We conrm the same result in presence of
asymmetries of information between the government and the rm(s).
To gain insights on how well the model predicts the tax decision of extractive countries, we
simulate the tax decision using data from Mining Tax Database for Africa10 (Laporte et al. 2016).
This database focuses on gold-producing countries in Africa and it documents that prot taxes in
extractive industries range between 5% to 35%. Considering this range of values for prot taxes
and setting parameters  = 1:7 and r = 10%, we show in Figure 1, the optimal royalties rates
given by our model in equation (3). More specically, we graph the royalty rates (3) for country
i and j as a function of the overstatement coe¢ cient. Each graph in Figure 1 corresponds to
di¤erent pairs of prot taxes ( i ; 

j): We start with the highest possible di¤erence in prot taxes
namely  i = 35% (red) and  j = 5% (black); then  i = 35% (red) and  j = 15% (black);  i = 35%
(red) and  j = 20% (black);  i = 35% (red) and  j = 25% (black);  i =  j = 35%. 11
10The case of African gold-producing countries is particularly relevant to calibrate our model.
In Latin American Mineral-producers countries have very comparable royalty and CIT rates (NSI
2013), but we do not have a database as accurate as for Africa.
11All these values are consistent with condition (4).
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Figure 1: Optimal royalty rates i() and j()
The resulting royalties produced by our model well match data observed in Mining Tax Data-
base for Africa. Namely, as stated in this database, the royalty rates range between 1% to 15%. As
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one can observe through the graphs, the royalty j() gets smaller as the prot tax  j moves from
5% to 35%. Furthermore, in line with Figure 1, comparative statics on the optimal royalty rates
suggest that the higher the overstatement coe¢ cient, the higher the optimal rate of the royalty.
@i
@i
= maxi
  (1  maxi ) (1 + r)
 ( 2maxi + imaxi + 2)2
> 0; i = a; b
The intuition of this relationship is as follows. An increase of the overstatement coe¢ cient i
implies that the rm declares a smaller prot because it amplies more the declared extraction
costs. This necessarily translates into smaller tax receipts deriving from the prot tax. As a
consequence, the government increases the royalty over rms revenues to compensate for the
negative e¤ect of amplied costs.
To discern the relationship between the royalty and the prot tax, we explore the sign of
@i
@maxi
: If i > 2

 r 1 ; i = a; b; then
@i
@maxi
> 0; otherwise, @

i
@maxi
< 0: When  is very high,
the two tax instruments are complements: the higher the prot tax, the higher the royalty. By
contrast, when  is small, the tax instruments are substitute: the higher the prot tax, the lower
the royalty. When overstatement is large, governments optimally select tax instruments that are
complements to o¤set the large loss in tax revenues. More specically, with high ; the government
observes very large declared extraction costs and very reduced declared prots. Accordingly, to
optimally collect tax receipts, the government increases the royalty rate on perfectly observable
rms revenues as well as the prot tax rate on prots, leading to a positive relationship between
the two tax instruments. By contrast, when  remains low, an increase of the prot tax leads to a
decrease of the royalty, recovering a classical result in public policy. In this case, the government
is careful not to discourage the investment of the mining rm through high taxes. We believe that
a reasonable assumption about the range of values for the coe¢ cient of overstatement is that i;
i = a; b; does not exceed two. Hence, for 1  i < 2; i = a; b; the inequality i < 2  r 1 is always
satised, leading to a negative relationship between the prot tax and the royalty.
Summarizing,
Lemma 1. The optimal royalty rate increases with the coe¢ cient of overstatement but it
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decreases with the optimal prot tax.
The optimal capital investment obtains as
Ki =
  (1  maxi ) (1 + r)
2 (1  maxi ) + imaxi
; i = a; b
Comparative statics on capital invested yield @K

i
@i
< 0 and @K

i
@maxi
> 0 for i < 2: Hence,
Lemma 2. The optimal level of invested capital depends negatively on the coe¢ cient of over-
statement and positively on the prot tax.
The positive relationship between the invested capital and the prot tax is surprising. To
grasp the intuition of this result, we must recall that the invested capital is a negative function of
the royalty as shown in equation (2). In turn, the royalty decreases with the prot tax rate as
shown in Lemma 1. Hence, a higher prot tax implies lower royalties, which ultimately leads to
an increase in the invested capital. Quite on the contrary, a higher ; implies higher royalty, and
therefore by equation (2), lower invested capital.
Finally, we can evaluate both the real prot of the rm and the tax revenue for the government
at the optimal taxes:


i=
(1  maxi )
2 (1 + r)
(  r   1 + maxi (1 + r))2
(2  maxi (2  i))2
> 0; i = a; b
and
Ri =
1
2
(  r   1 + maxi (1 + r))2
2  (2  i) maxi
> 0; i = a; b
As expected, the overstatement of extraction costs has clearly a negative impact on tax revenues
@Ri
@i
< 0. Unexpectedly, cost overstatement has also detrimental e¤ects on rms prots: @
R
i
@i
< 0:
In fact, cost overstatement induces the government to raise royalties to o¤set the negative impact
of amplied extraction costs, ultimately leading to negative e¤ects on rms prots.
To conclude, in absence of tax competition threats, reducing cost overstatement is a win-win
action for both stakeholders. It brings higher prots for the rm and higher tax revenues for the
12
government.
3.2 Tax competition
In this section, we assume that the foreign rm can place its investment in one of two countries.
What is the optimal policy mix ( ; ) that allows the government not only to maximize tax
revenues but also to attract the rm to its territory? The rm locates in country i if and only
if i > 

j :
12 Note that even if our setting remains quite simple, there are several forces in place
that attract or repel a rm from a country. For instance, it is unclear whether the magnitude of
cost overstatement attracts a rm in a country. The size of  positively a¤ects the royalty rate
but it negatively impacts the invested capital. Similarly, it is unsure how the prot tax a¤ects the
decision of the rm where to locate. The prot tax obviously shrinks the net prot, but it also
reduces the royalty rate, which in turn boosts invested capital and prot. What is the balance of
these forces and under what conditions is that balanced reached is the topic of the analysis that
follows.
We proceed in steps. We rst o¤set the e¤ect of the di¤erence in overstatements by assuming
countries are characterized by the same overstatement i.e. i = j = : By doing so, we highlight
the role of prot taxes in making a country attractive for foreign rms. The prot di¤erential
i   j is given by
i   j = 12(r+1)

(1 maxi )( r 1+maxi +rmaxi )
2
( 2maxi +imaxi +2)
2   (1 
max
j )( r 1+maxj +rmaxj )
2
( 2maxj +jmaxj +2)
2

; j; i = a; b; j 6= i
(5)
To analyze the sign of the above di¤erence notice that the expression (5) is simply the di¤erence
of the same function i , evaluated at two di¤erent levels of the prot tax, namely 
max
i and
maxj . Hence, to study the sign of the di¤erence 

i   j ; as a su¢ cient condition we check the
sign of the derivative @

i
@maxi
: We prove in Appendix A that this derivative can be either positive
or negative depending on the level of prot taxes maxi and 
max
j . In Appendix A, we dene a
12It is important to notice that the location decision is made considering the real prot and not the declared one.
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threshold value ~ and show that the derivative @

i
@maxi
is positive for max

maxi ; 
max
j
	
< ~ ; and
negative for max

maxi ; 
max
j
	
> ~ : It follows that if maxi and 
max
j are both smaller than ~ ; then
i   j > 0: However, if both maxi and maxj exceed ~ ; then i   j < 0:
The result is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Assume countries have the same cost overstatement. Tax competition privileges
the country o¤ering the highest prot tax if prot taxes in both countries do not exceed a threshold
value ~ . By contrast, if prot taxes are set higher than ~ in both countries, then the rm locates
in the country with the lowest prot tax.
Surprisingly, having a higher prot tax does not hinder attracting a foreign rm. The reason is
that the accompanying royalty rate is more advantageous than in the rival country. In fact, when
 < ~ ; the attractive country i has the highest prot tax but the smallest royalty, i.e. maxi > 
max
j
but i < 

j ; i; j = a; b; i 6= j: By contrast, when  > ~ ; the attractive country i has the smallest
prot tax and the highest royalty, i.e. maxi < 
max
j but 

i > 

j ; i; j = a; b; i 6= j:
As an illustration, we run simulations of the prot functions displayed in Figure 2. To do so,
we use the same parameter values as above, namely  = 1:7 and r = 10%: We consider as before
several combinations of prot taxes:
( i ; 

j) = (35%; 5%); (35%; 15%); (35%; 20%); (35%; 25%); (35%; 30%); (35%; 35%):
These values of prot taxes are in line with the real prot tax rates in Laporte et al, 2016.
The prot in country i (in red) is higher than the prot j (in black) the rm makes if located in
country j: Therefore for all these combinations of prot taxes we have i   j > 0: This is the
case because the threshold ~ is given by ~ = 57%:
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Figure 2: Optimal prots i () and 

j()
This means that setting any prot taxes in the range (5%; 35%); is a su¢ cient condition for
country i to attract the rm, because for  i and  j in the range (5%; 35%), i > 

j implying
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i   j > 0: The reason is that country i o¤ers a lower royalty rate that country j: For instance
if the rival country j xes a very low prot tax, say  j = 5%; and country i xes a prot rate of
35%, royalty rate in i is 3% whereas country j has a royalty of 15%.
Hence, extractive countries may use interchangeably prot taxes or royalties as means of at-
tractiveness. As long as the prot tax does not exceed a threshold value, then the high prot
tax determines a low royalty, making the country with the highest prot tax attractive. The
instrument of attractiveness is the low royalty. Quite on the contrary, when prot taxes in both
countries are xed at levels that exceed a certain threshold, then the rm tries to avoid the coun-
tries with the highest prot tax. In this range of values, the prot tax becomes the instrument of
attractiveness, regardless of the corresponding level of the royalty.
We now turn to the role of the rate of overstatement in the tax competition game. To do so, for
the time being, we switch o¤the role played by the prot tax di¤erential assuming maxi = 
max
j =  .
Then, the rm decides where to locate by the sign of the prot di¤erential:
i   j =
 
j   i
 (1 )( 1 r+(1+r))2
2(1+r)

4(1 )+(i+j)
(2+(j 2))
2
(2+(i 2))2
(6)
The study of the prot di¤erential leads to the following result:
Proposition 3 Assume the same prot tax in each country. The rm locates in the country with
the lowest cost overstatement.
Proof. The sign of the di¤erence (6) is given by the sign of 4  4 +   i + j and  j   i :
Since 0 <  < 1; then 4  4 +   i + j > 0; implying i j > 0 i¤  j   i > 0, j > i,
i; j = a; b; i 6= j:
The intuition behind the above proposition lays in the relationship between the cost overstate-
ment and the level of royalty. Recall that the lower cost overstatement, the lower the royalty.
Therefore, when prot taxes of both countries are the same, the most attractive location corre-
sponds to the country with the lowest cost overstatement, where the royalty is the lowest and
invested capital is the highest.
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As above, to illustrate our analysis, we represent in Figure 3, the prots i (red) and 

j(black)
for any  2 (0; 1) with maxi = maxj =  , assuming  = 1:7; r = 10% and i = 1:5: Country i
attracts the rm o¤ering higher prots i.e. i   j > 0 if j > i; whereas it does not attract
the rm because i   j < 0 if j < i.
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Prot functions i (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and j() (black) when
i = 1:5 and j = 1:75
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) (red)
and j() (black) when
i = 1:5 and j = 1:05
Figure 3. Optimal prots i () and 

j()
The nal scenario to consider embodies the interplay between the role played by the overstate-
ment, which determines the royalty, and the magnitude of the prot tax. To disentangle these two
forces, we need a direct comparison of the prots, which results to be quite cumbersome for any
value of the overstatement coe¢ cient and any value the prot tax. For this reason, we simulate
the prot functions in country i and country j for admissible values of the parameters.
First, consider a high di¤erence in prot taxes namely  maxi = 35% and 
max
j = 5%: As
before, set  = 1:7 and r = 10%: Then, we ask which country attracts the rm and what is the
role of i and j: In Figure 4, the prot di¤erence 

i  j is shown in the y  axis and the value
of j in the x axis. As far as it concerns i; we consider four di¤erent levels of i; 1.1;1.3; 1.5;
1.7 and build four di¤erent curves i   j . The highest of curve corresponds to i = 1:1:
Figure 4: The di¤erence in prots when prot taxes di¤er very much
As the value of i increases, the curve 

i   j shifts down but it remains positive. Hence,
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country i with a much higher tax rate than country j attracts the rm in its territory, for any j;
j ? i: The reason of attractiveness is the lower royalty.
We reproduce the same simulations in Figure 5 but we now consider a small di¤erence in prot
taxes namely maxi = 20% and 
max
j = 18%: As we can see, simulations display the existence
of a threshold value ~; where the curve of the prot di¤erence i   j turns from negative to
positive showing that there exists a value of overstatement such that the country i is attractive
even though it has higher prot taxes: The rm locates in the country i with maxi = 20% and not
in j with maxj = 18% if j > ~ (on the graph, on the right of ~; 

i > j). Conversely, the rm
locates in the country with the lowest prot tax if the rate of overstatement does not exceeds ~
(on the graph, on the left of ~; i < j): As earlier, the reason for attractiveness is the lower
royalty.
Figure 5: The di¤erence in prots when prot taxes are similar
Hence,
Proposition 4 Assume the prot taxes in two countries do not di¤er much. If overstatement in
a country remains relatively low, then a country is attractive for foreign rms through low royalty.
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If the rate of overstatement is relatively high, then a country is attractive for foreign rms through
low prot tax.
Our analysis shows countries su¤ering from a high overstatement, the ine¢ ciencies related to
royalties are amplied. Indeed, to be attractive, these countries x low prot taxes, which in
turn increases royalties. This result is in line with our stylized facts displayed in the introduction
concerning the evolution of the taxation of gold extraction in Africa.
To conclude, we observe that international attractiveness is not built using exclusively policy
taxation, but rather, attractiveness also depends on the level of cost overstatement. A very low
overstatement of costs (lower ) combined with a certain level of prot tax (even greater than the
level of prot tax in the rival country) leads to small royalties, which makes the country attractive.
To be attractive, the government in a developing country either needs to reduce informational
asymmetry by improving its expertise in extractive activities or ghting corruption.
In appendix B, we explore the e¤ects of a di¤erent scheme of overstatement. We hypothesize
that the coe¢ cient of overstatement is a linear positive function of the prot tax namely i i.
Under such assumption, the prot tax becomes an interior solution and a function of i: Under
a variable cost overstatement, the mining country that attracts the extractive rm is the country
with the highest coe¢ cient of overstatement and the lowest royalty.
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4 Optimal tax design in the absence of overstatement
We are now in a position to underscore the distorting e¤ects of cost overstatement on tax policies
and the capital invested by the rm. To do so, we check the optimal tax policy in absence of cost
overstatement. The capital invested as a function of the royalty is again given by the expression
(2). Thus, tax revenues write as
Ri (i;  i) = i (Ki(i) +  i

(1  i)Ki(i)  1
2
Ki(i)
2

; i = a; b
The maximization of tax revenues gives the following optimal choice for the government ( i; i):
i =
  1  r   maxi
 (2  maxi )
; i = a; b
 i = 
max
i ; i = a; b
Choosing the maximum possible prot tax yields the lowest possible royalty, since @i=@maxi < 0:
The corresponding optimal capital invested is
Ki =
  r   1 + maxi (1 + r)
2  maxi
; i = a; b
As before, @
Ki
@maxi
> 0 : higher prot taxes, imply higher invested capital, because higher prot
taxes imply lower royalties.
Evaluating the prot for the rm and the tax revenues at the optimal tax rates, we obtain
i(i;  i) =
1
2
(1  maxi )
(  r   1 + maxi (1 + r))2
(maxi   2)2 (1 + r)
; i = a; b
and
Ri =
1
2
(  r   1 + maxi (1 + r))2
2  maxi
; i = a; b:
To evaluate the impact of cost overstatement on taxes and capital invested by the rm, we com-
pare governmental choices under overstatement and in the absence of overstatement. By direct
comparison we obtain
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Proposition 5 Constant overstatement of production costs puts upward pressure on the royalty
and downward pressure on the capital invested, lowering both the rms prots and the govern-
mentstax revenues, as compared to the scenario with absent overstatement.
Proof. The di¤erence in optimal royalties is given by maxi (i   1)  1 r+
max
i +r
max
i
(2 maxi )(2 2 i+imaxi )
> 0;
whereas the optimal invested capital di¤erence is  maxi (i   1) + r+
max
i +r
max
i  1
(2 maxi )(2 2maxi +imaxi )
< 0:
Moreover, the prot di¤erence is 1
2
  
max
i (1 maxi )(i 1)(4 3maxi +imaxi )( r+maxi +rmaxi  1)
2
(maxi  2)
2
(+imaxi +2 2maxi )
2
(r+1)
< 0;and nally, the di¤erence in tax rev-
enue is
 1
2
maxi (  r +  + r   1)2 i 1(2 maxi )(2 2maxi +maxi i) < 0:
5 Conclusion
It is widely acknowledged that mining industries hosted in developing countries su¤er from serious
asymmetries of information between the rms that exploit the mines and the government that
levies several taxes often distortive to raise tax revenues. Asymmetries of information often
concern the overstatement of production costs as a mean of reducing tax liabilities. This issue
draws even more attention in the presence of a foreign multinational rm for at least two reasons.
First, the multinational rm may have a technical advantage over the developing countrys experts.
This technical advantage may be used to overstate costs. Second, by denition, the mobility of
this type of rm is very high and justies a tax competition framework. A multinational rm
can exert pressure by threatening to exploit a mine in a di¤erent country in order to gain tax
advantages. Hence, in such a setting, one may naturally ask what are the e¤ects of asymmetries of
information on tax policies in the presence of international tax competition that adds pressure on
governments. Shedding light on this issue is the purpose of the present paper, which has yielded
some interesting results.
Under a constant rate of overstatement of costs, if the country is a¤ected by a strong asymmetry
of information, the distortions caused by royalties are amplied and are detrimental to both the
government and the rms revenues. Indeed, to be attractive, a country will decrease the prot
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tax rate and increase the royalty. If cost overstatement is a function of the prot tax however,
asymmetries of information may bring advantages to the rm while remaining detrimental for tax
revenues. In this case, variability in the overstatement rate neutralizes the role of the prot tax in
the attractiveness of the country and the foreign rm locates where she can overstate the most.
Whether constant or variable, cost overstatement puts downward pressure on government tax
revenues.
From a tax policy point of view, it appears that the reduction of information asymmetries,
with the aim of decreasing cost overstatement, is a key strategy to increase tax revenues and to
reduce the distortive tax instruments. For several decades now, it is noted that lack of expertise
in mining sector of developing countries represents a serious handicap13. This is what our model
theoretically proves. The main international aid agencies have already led projects of mining
sector capacity building notably in West Africa. These e¤orts for reinforcing expertise must be
strengthened to achieve complementarity with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
(EITI).
Reinforcing expertise in mining sector for reducing asymmetries appears to be a priority over a
tax harmonization process that could be a response to the negative e¤ects of the tax competition
showed in our model. To the best of our knowledge, Mansour and Swistack (2016) and Mansour
and Rota-Graziosi (2014) are the only papers analyzing an eventual tax harmonization for extrac-
tive industries in developing countries. Both papers have great reservations on this issue. First,
the costs of a regional coordination are very high and the importance of the resource revenue for
the governments weakens the incentive for good policy practice. Second, coordination on one tax,
statutory tax for instance, could shift competition to other instruments and notably to derogatory
regimes. This last seems the main reason why tax coordination among West African Economic
and Monetary Union States has not been e¤ective.
13Burkina Faso has excellent geological potential as is evidenced by the interest showed by major international
mining companies. However [. . . ] Burkina Faso currently lacks a complete regulatory and scal framework, and
the human and institutional capacity to e¤ectively administer or to ensure adequate environmental management
of mining.World Bank 1997, Mining sector capacity building and environment management project, Report No.
P 7048-BUR.
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Future empirical works can be envisaged that would test the main results of our model. The
success of this empirical analysis relies on the careful approximation of the coe¢ cient of cost
overstatement. With a good proxy for ; it could be interesting to investigate how the intensity of
asymmetries of information a¤ect the tax policy and government tax revenues in mining countries.
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Appendix A: Derivation of threshold ~
The sign of the derivarive @i
@maxi
is given by the sign of the expression
(2r   r + 2  )  2 + (p   2     r   4r   4)  + (2r + 2p+ 2 + 2r   2p + 2)
which is a convex parabola with two positive roots given by
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~ =   1
( 2)(r+1)

2r + p+ 1
2
 + 1
2
r   1
2
p
 1
2
p
(2p+  + r   p) (2p+ 9 + 9r   p) + 2

;
 =   1
( 2)(r+1)

2r + p+ 1
2
 + 1
2
r   1
2
p
+1
2
p
(2p+  + r   p) (2p+ 9 + 9r   p) + 2

We prove that root ~ is positive and smaller than one and thus acceptable for our setting,
whereas  > 1:
~
?
< 1 (7)
2 (r + 1) +   1
2
 (  r   1)
 1
2
p
(2 +  + r   ) (2 + 9 + 9r   )

?
< (2  ) (r + 1)
2 (r + 1) +   1
2
 ((  r   1) ?<
p
(2 +  + r   ) (2 + 9 + 9r   )
Both the LHS and RHS of the above inequality are monotone increasing functions of ; under
the assumptions of the model that  < 2 and  > 1 + r: Evaluated at the smallest value of
; i:e: = 1 + r and  = 2 (it actually holds for any  2 [1; 2]) we have
5(1 + r) <
q
36 (r + 1)2
which is true. Evaluating the inequality for very large but nite values of ; we have that
(1  0:5) < (2  )
which is again true. Hence, for the lowest value of  the RHS is bigger than the LHS. As 
increases, the RHS is alwas higher than the LHS. Hence, due to monotonicity of the RHS and
LHS, the inequality (7) is always true for all admissible values of : It follows that ~ < 1: Clearly
~ > 0: Using the same method, we show easily that the other root  exceeds 1. It follows that
in the interval (0,1) where maxi lays, the parabola is rst positive and then negative. Hence, for
 < ~ ; the derivative @i
@maxi
> 0; and for  > ~ ; @i
@maxi
< 0: QDE
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Appendix B: Optimal tax design under variable overstate-
ment
Absence of tax competition
In this section, we assume that the coe¢ cient of overstatement is a function of the prot tax
 i; namely i i, i = a; b as suggested by Boadway and Keen (2010). Hence, the higher the prot
tax in the country, the higher the incentive for the rm to overstate its costs. As above, a rm
maximizes the prot function given by expression (1) to determine the optimal capital investment
as a function of taxes, given (as above) by
Ki(i) =  (1  i)  r   1 > 0; i = a; b: (8)
The government maximizes tax revenues Ri( i; i) taking into account the real initial investments
Ki(i) and the declared prots of the rm, which now include i i :
Ri (i;  i) =
1
1+r

iKi(i) +  i
 
(1  i)K(i)  i i 12 (Ki(i))2

In contrast to the scenario of constant overstatement, concavity conditions are satised for both
the prot tax and the royalty, yielding interior solutions for both tax instruments. Investigating
the rst order condition of the maximization problem maxi; i Ri (i;  i) ; we obtain the
following:
Proposition 6 Under a variable cost overstatement, the government decides on the following
optimal tax mix (i;  i):
i =
(i 1) i(1+r)
(2i 1) ;  i =
1+r+
(1 i)(1+r)+i ; i = a; b: (9)
Positivity of the optimal royalty is guaranteed by the condition (4) : Substituting 9 in equation
(2) ; we obtain the corresponding optimal invested capital invested:
Ki =
1+r+i( r 1)
2i 1 ; i = a; b:
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Comparative statics with respect to the coe¢ cient of overstatement lead to the following results
Lemma 3. The coe¢ cient of overstatement i positively a¤ects the prot tax but it reduces
both the royalty and the optimal invested capital.
Proof. Taking the partial derivative, we obtain@ i
@i
= r++1
(2i 1)2
> 0; @
i
@i
= (r +  + 1) r+1 
( r+i+ri i 1)2
<
0; @
Ki
@i
=   r++1
(2i 1)2
< 0:
In contrast to the result obtain in Lemma 1, under variable overstatement, a higher  lowers
the royalty. Finally, the rmsprots i and the tax revenue for the government Ri evaluated at
the optimal policy mix obtain as
i=
1
2
i (  r   1)
 (i   1)  i (1 + r)
(2i   1)2 (1 + r)
; i = a; b14
and
Ri =
1
2
(r    + 1)2 i + 2 (r + 1)
2i   1
; i = a; b
As in Section 3.1, the overstatement of production costs still has a negative impact on tax revenues
@Ri
@i
< 0. However, in contrast to the preceding scenario, cost overstatement now has benecial
e¤ects on the rms prots. Indeed, @
R
i
@i
> 0: Variable overstatement of costs induces the gov-
ernment to lower royalties, leading to a positive nal e¤ect on a rmsprots.
Tax competition
Taxes being interior solutions, in this scenario, the prot depends solely on the coe¢ cient of
overstatement, i; i = a; b: Furthermore, as just stated above
@ i
@i
> 0: This implies that
Proposition 7 Assuming a variable cost overstatement, the mining country that attracts the ex-
tractive rm is the country with the highest coe¢ cient of overstatement and the lowest royalty.
To summarize, under variable overstatement, the distortion of asymmetric information becomes
even more accentuated. A rm decides to locate where overstatement is the highest, even if the
prot tax is also the highest. Furthermore, this choice of location distorts the capital invested by
reducing it considerably: Hence, variable overstatement not only distorts the tax choices of the
government, but also the level of capital invested.
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Comparison
We compare taxes and capital invested by the rm, as well as prots and tax revenues, in
the presence and absence of overstatement. Nonetheless, comparing these two scenarios is now
tricky because under variable overstatement the prot tax is an interior solution depending on i;
whereas in absence of overstatement, the prot tax is a corner solution on the size of which we
remain agnostic. To make this comparison possible, we will make the simplifying assumption that
maxi =  i:
By direct comparison, we obtain
Proposition 8 Variable overstatement of production costs puts upward pressure on the royalty
and downward pressure on the capital invested. It always lowers the tax revenues but it may turn
positive for the rmsprots.
Proof. The royalty comparison is (imaxi   1) r++1(2 maxi )(2i 1) > 0; the optimal capital invested
di¤erence is   (r +  + 1) imaxi  1
(2 maxi )(2i 1)
< 0; the di¤erence in the rmsprots is
1
2
 
(r + 3 + 1) (r    + 1)2 i + 42 (r + 1)
 +i+ri i
(2i 1)2(r +1)2(r+i+1 i ri)
which can be posi-
tive or negative; and the tax revenue comparisonwrites as 1
2
(r + 1) (r +  + 1) (r +1)
2i+2(r+1)
(2i 1)( r 1)( r+i+ri i 1)
< 0 for  > 1 + r:
Variable overstatement may be protable for the rm, whereas constant overstatement is always
detrimental for both rms and governments.
29
